关联交易下大股东掏空行为研究——以ST天马为例

Research on the Hollowing-Out Behavior of Major Shareholders under Related Party Transactions—Taking ST Tianma as an Example

摘要: 随着资本市场的不断壮大，证券市场上不断涌现出大股东利用关联交易掏空上市公司的事件。文章以大股东掏空ST天马为典型案例，分析其掏空天马公司的路径与经济后果。研究发现，天马公司大股东利用关联方关系占用大量公司的非经营性资金，以公司名义对外借款，利用基金收购大股东的资产来将公司的资金转移至大股东处，天马公司的内部控制失效也为大股东掏空的行为提供了合适的外部环境，最终导致天马公司的盈利能力和现金流受到了极大的影响。本文从内部控制的角度提出改进公司权力结构、完善内部控制体系，为对规范大股东行为、保护中小投资者的切身利益、维护资本市场秩序提供借鉴。

Abstract: With the continuous growth of the capital market, incidents have emerged in the securities market where major shareholders use related party transactions to hollow out listed companies. This paper takes the hollowing out of ST Tianma by a major shareholder as a typical case to analyze the path and economic consequences of hollowing out Tianma Company. The study found that the major shareholder of Tianma Company used the relationship of related parties to occupy a large amount of the company’s non-operating funds, borrowed money in the name of the company, and used the fund to acquire the assets of the major shareholder to transfer the company’s funds to the major shareholder, and the failure of Tianma’s internal control also provided a suitable external environment for the behavior of the major shareholder to hollow out, which ultimately led to the great impact of Tianma’s profitability and cash flow. From the perspective of internal control, this paper proposes to improve the company’s power structure and improve the internal control system, so as to provide a reference for regulating the behavior of major shareholders, protecting the vital interests of small and medium-sized investors, and maintaining the order of the capital market.