制造商风险规避下考虑企业社会责任的绿色供应链决策研究

Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-Making Considering Corporate Social Responsibility under Manufacturer Risk Avoidance

摘要: 本文构建了风险厌恶的制造商和风险中性的零售商组成的绿色供应链，运用Stackelberg博弈模型研究供应链成员承担企业社会责任的合作策略，并分析风险厌恶程度和承担企业社会责任水平对绿色创新投入、供应链均衡价格以及供应链利润的影响。研究表明无论上下游是否共同合作承担企业社会责任，制造商的风险规避行为与绿色产品创新投入、产品定价、产品售价成负相关，且当只有制造商承担企业社会责任时，制造商绿色创新投入所收到风险规避的影响不依赖制造商承担企业社会责任的水平；当零售商承担企业社会责任时绿色创新投入影响波动较大。

Abstract: This article constructs a green supply chain consisting of risk averse manufacturers and risk neutral retailers. The Stackelberg game model is used to study the cooperative strategies of supply chain members in assuming corporate social responsibility, and the impact of risk aver-sion and level of corporate social responsibility on green innovation investment, supply chain equilibrium prices, and supply chain profits is analyzed. Research has shown that regardless of whether upstream and downstream cooperate to undertake corporate social responsibility, the risk avoidance behavior of manufacturers is negatively correlated with green product innovation investment, product pricing, and product selling price. Moreover, when only manufacturers bear corporate social responsibility, the impact of risk avoidance on manufacturers’ green innovation investment does not depend on their level of corporate social responsibility; When retailers assume corporate social responsibility, the impact of green innovation investment fluctuates greatly.