带负顾客的Geo/Geo/1排队策略与服务定价研究

Research on Geo/Geo/1 Queuing Strategy and Service Pricing with Negative Customers

摘要: 顾客行为和服务定价是影响服务系统价值的关键要素，对系统的拥堵控制、收益管理以及服务质量控制等方面具有重要的作用。本文将两种服务价格机制引入到带负顾客的离散时间排队系统中，分别研究可见与不可见情形下顾客的均衡策略及企业的最优服务定价问题。正顾客到达系统后，会基于“收益–成本”结构，决定是否进入或退出系统。当负顾客到达系统时，会移除正在接受服务的正顾客。本文首先求得系统的稳态分布，利用斯塔克博格博弈模型分别求出顾客的均衡策略和企业的最优服务价格。最后通过数值模拟，说明了不同参数对顾客策略和企业效益的影响。

Abstract: Customer behavior and service pricing are key factors that affect the value of service systems, play-ing an important role in congestion control, revenue management, and service quality control. This article introduces two service pricing mechanisms into a discrete-time queuing system with nega-tive customers, and studies the equilibrium strategy of customers in visible and invisible situations, as well as the optimal service pricing problem of enterprises. After a regular customer arrives at the system, they will decide whether to enter or exit the system based on the “benefit cost” structure. When negative customers arrive at the system, positive customers who are receiving service will be removed. This article first obtains the steady-state distribution of the system, and uses the Stackel-berg game model to separately determine the equilibrium strategy of customers and the optimal service price of the enterprise. Finally, numerical simulations were conducted to demonstrate the impact of different parameters on customer strategy and corporate efficiency.