基于生鲜农产品供应链上的随机演化博弈分析

Random Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain

摘要: 针对生鲜农产品供应链上物流资源投入程度在不确定性环境下的演化问题，将高斯白噪声作为供应链上的随机干扰项引入演化博弈，构建了在不确定性环境中生鲜农产品供应链上的随机演化博弈模型，分析了政府监管部门、供应商和加工商策略选择的稳定性，并将Itô型随机微分方程用随机Taylor展开后进行仿真模拟。研究结果表明，当供应链上的行为主体采取积极态度的策略时，随着干扰强度的增大，博弈方会更快的趋于稳定状态；当供应链上的行为主体采取消极态度的策略时，随着干扰强度的增大，博弈方会渐渐地趋于不稳定状态。

Abstract: In view of the evolution of logistics resource investment in fresh agricultural products supply chain in the uncertain environment, Gaussian white noise is introduced into evolutionary game as a random interference item in the supply chain, and a stochastic evolutionary game model on fresh agricultural products supply chain in the uncertain environment is constructed. The stability of strategic choice of government regulators, suppliers and processors is analyzed, and Itô type stochastic differential equations are simulated by random Taylor expansion. The results show that when the actors in the supply chain adopt a positive attitude strategy, with the increase of the intensity of interference, the players will tend to a stable state faster; when the actors in the supply chain adopt the strategy of negative attitude, with the increase of the intensity of interference, the players will gradually tend to an unstable state.