工业固废处置供应链激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Industrial Solid Waste Disposal Supply Chain

摘要: 在当前固体废物污染环境防治坚持全链接担责要求下，为实现安全、高效处置目标，利用固废处置供应链动态激励机制促进链上企业合作、防范机会主义行为。本文基于产废企业和利废企业组成的单期和长期合作的委托代理模型，研究固废处置供应链动态激励及固废处置的安全高效问题，分别求解两种模型下的最优激励水平和努力水平，并进一步通过数值算例验证相关结论。研究表明：提高最低环境安全风险率、调整污染责任分担比例可以促进链上企业增强努力和激励；进一步地，动态激励机制不仅在固废处置供应链中发挥机会主义行为防范作用，而且能够为链上企业提供收入保障和实力认证，是固废处置供应链协调中的有效工具。

Abstract: Under the current requirements of full link responsibility for the prevention and control of solid waste pollution, in order to achieve the goal of safe and efficient disposal, the dynamic incentive mechanism of solid waste disposal supply chain is used to promote cooperation between enterprises on the chain and prevent opportunistic behaviors. Based on the single-phase and long-term cooperation principal-agent model composed of waste production enterprises and waste profit enterprises, this paper studies the dynamic incentive of solid waste disposal supply chain and the safety and efficiency of solid waste disposal, respectively solving the optimal incentive level and effort level under the two models, and further verifies the relevant conclusions through numerical examples. The results show that raising the minimum risk rate of environmental safety and adjusting the proportion of pollution responsibility sharing can promote the enterprises on the chain to enhance their efforts and incentives; Further, dynamic incentive mechanism not only plays the role of opportunist behavior prevention in the solid waste disposal supply chain, but also provides income security and strength certification for enterprises on the chain, and is an effective tool in the coordination of solid waste disposal supply chain.