购物中心节能改造三方演化博弈分析
Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Renovation of Shopping Malls
摘要: 建筑业对环境恶化有着显著的影响。现有商业建筑节能改造已成为降低建筑能耗的有效手段。随着能源危机逐渐加剧,社会公民的环境保护意识不断提升,建筑业的节能改造已成为当前城市可持续发展的议题之一。本文从商业建筑中挑选购物中心作为研究对象,探讨了政府、投资商和租户在购物中心节能改造过程中的互动关系和利益平衡。政府作为政策制定者和监管者,通过提供罚款、补贴等激励措施,引导投资商和租户参与节能改造。投资商在成本和收益的权衡下,需要评估节能改造的长期经济效益和市场竞争力。租户则关注改造对日常运营的影响和顾客体验,同时也寻求通过节能措施降低运营成本。本文的研究为购物中心节能改造提供了一种多利益相关者协作的三方演化博弈决策框架。
Abstract: The construction industry has a significant impact on environmental degradation. Energy-saving renovation of existing commercial buildings has become an effective means to reduce building energy consumption. As the energy crisis gradually intensifies, citizens’ awareness of environmental protection continues to increase, and energy-saving renovation of the building industry has become one of the current issues of sustainable urban development. This paper selects shopping malls as the research object from commercial buildings, and explores the interactive relationship and interest balance between the government, investors and tenants in the process of energy-saving transformation of shopping malls. As a policy maker and regulator, the government guides investors and tenants to participate in energy-saving transformation by providing incentives such as fines and subsidies. Investors need to evaluate the long-term economic benefits and market competitiveness of energy-saving transformation in the balance of costs and benefits. Tenants are concerned about the impact of transformation on daily operations and customer experience, and also seek to reduce operating costs through energy-saving measures. This study provides a three-party evolutionary game decision-making framework for multi-stakeholder collaboration for energy-saving transformation of shopping malls.
文章引用:胡昊天, 蒋君. 购物中心节能改造三方演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2024, 14(4): 166-179. https://doi.org/10.12677/orf.2024.144385

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