共同过失犯罪肯定论——基于《刑法》第25条的再解释

Positive Conclusion of Joint Negligent Crime—Reinterpretation Based on Article 25 of the Criminal Code

摘要: 因“共同犯罪是指共同故意犯罪”的立法例，共同过失犯罪难以为通说所肯定。但比较各国的偏向行为共同说亦或犯罪共同说的立法例，共同过失犯罪在各国司法判决中仍存在解释空间。因此，基于我国刑法中共同犯罪的规定于解释论层面也可对共同过失犯罪的合法性和合理性作出说明。我国刑法中的“不以共同犯罪论处”并未在立法上否定共同过失犯罪，而是对共同过失犯罪不以共同故意犯罪论处所作的说明。同款的“应当负刑事责任的，按照他们所犯的罪分别处罚”不仅指代过失共同正犯行为的可罚性，更系立法上反对罪名从属性以否认责任共犯论的说明。肯定共同过失犯罪不是刑法处罚范围的过度扩张和人权保障机能的失能，而是对法益更周全的保护。

Abstract: Because of the legislative example of “joint crime refers to joint intentional crime”, it is difficult to affirm the joint negligent crime. However, comparing the legislative examples of the common theory of biased acts or the common theory of crime in various countries, there is still room for interpretation of the joint negligence crime in the judicial decisions of various countries. Therefore, based on the provisions of joint crime in our criminal law, the legality and rationality of joint negligence crime can also be explained at the level of interpretation. In the criminal law of our country, “not to be punished with joint crime” does not negate the joint negligent crime in legislation, but explains that the joint negligent crime is not to be punished with joint intentional crime. In the same paragraph, “those who should bear criminal responsibility shall be punished separately according to the crimes they have committed” not only refers to the punishable behavior of negligent joint principal offender, but also explains the legislative opposition to the theory of criminal subordination to deny liability accomplice. It is affirmed that the joint negligence crime is not the excessive expansion of the scope of criminal punishment and the failure of the function of human rights protection, but the more comprehensive protection of legal interests.