国企债券违约市场化处置的法律选择

Legal Options for Market-Based Disposal of SOE Bond Defaults

摘要: 市场经济背景下，债券的刚性兑付模式因其具有增加地方政府债务风险、危害市场公平竞争、影响投资者长期利益等诸多弊端逐渐被打破。政府隐性担保预期下债券违约的省级传染效应也要求债券信用状况与地方财政水平分野。由此，以政府隐性担保为根本的刚性兑付模式亟须退出市场。但国有企业特殊的公共利益属性导致其不能轻易破产倒闭，国企债券违约仍需要政府救助。在不放弃政府救助的语境下，引入市场化违约处理机制能够利好经济市场发展。优化国企债券违约的处理机制，应当以强化债券发行人的信息披露义务、采用市场化信用机制为规范进路。以市场化信用机制替代政府隐性担保预期，应选择引入第三方担保机制、将ESG信息纳入风险预警系统、畅通债券退出通道等方式。

Abstract: In the context of the market economy, the rigid payment model of bonds is gradually being broken down because of its many drawbacks, such as increasing the risk of local government debt, jeopardizing fair competition in the market and affecting the long-term interests of investors. The provincial contagion effect of bond defaults in anticipation of implicit government guarantees also requires that bond creditworthiness be differentiated from the level of local finances. As a result, the rigid payment model, which is based on the implicit government guarantee, needs to be withdrawn from the market. However, the special public interest attributes of SOEs lead to the fact that they cannot easily go bankrupt and close down, and SOE bond defaults still require government bailouts. In the context of not giving up government bailout, the introduction of market-based default handling mechanism can benefit the economic market development. Optimizing the mechanism for dealing with SOE bond defaults should be regulated by strengthening bond issuers’ information disclosure obligations and adopting a market-based credit mechanism. To replace the government’s implicit guarantee with a market-based credit mechanism, the introduction of a third-party guarantee mechanism, the incorporation of ESG information into the risk early warning system, and a smooth bond exit channel should be chosen.