论拉兹自由的价值
On the Value of Raz’s Freedom
摘要: 在《自由的道德》一书中,面临修正主义者对自由是否具有价值的怀疑的挑战,拉兹从自由的预设和简单原则两个思路对自由的价值进行证成,认为自由不仅具有工具价值,还具有内在价值。自由价值的重构需要深思个人自主问题,自由价值的证成为拉兹自由主义至善论的进路奠定了一定的基础作用。
Abstract: In The Morality of Freedom, faced with the challenge of the revisionists’ skepticism about whether freedom has value, Raz evidences the value of freedom from two lines of thought, namely, the presupposition of freedom and the principle of simplicity, and argues that freedom has not only instrumental value, but also intrinsic value. The reconstruction of the value of freedom requires a deep reflection on the question of personal autonomy, and the justification of the value of freedom provides a certain fundamental role for the way forward of Raz’s theory of the Supreme Good.
参考文献
|
[1]
|
Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
|
|
[2]
|
约瑟夫·拉兹. 自由的道德[M]. 孙晓春, 等, 译. 长春: 吉林出版社, 2006.
|
|
[3]
|
Quong, J. (2011) Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford University Press.
|
|
[4]
|
姚大志. 论拉兹的至善论主义及其得失[J]. 求是学刊, 2007, 34(2): 39-44.
|
|
[5]
|
蒙兆敏. 论拉兹《自由的道德》中的自主概念[D]: [硕士学位论文]. 贵州: 贵州大学, 2022.
|
|
[6]
|
邓茹月. 论拉兹的非个人主义自由观[D]: [硕士学位论文]. 重庆: 西南大学, 2022.
|
|
[7]
|
吴攀. 约瑟夫·拉兹的自由主义至善论研究[D]: [硕士学位论文]. 杭州: 浙江大学, 2014.
|