结合SEIR与演化博弈模型的舆情引导策略研究

Public Sentiment Management Strategies Combining the SEIR and Evolutionary Game Model

摘要: [研究目的]突发事件引起的网络舆情可能造成社会恐慌，监管部门可以通过监管网络媒体或发布官方信息抑制舆情发酵。[研究方法]本研究将监管部门媒体的演化博弈模型与舆情传播模型结合，探讨控制舆情的有效途径。[研究结论]研究发现，仅在监管部门高力度惩罚下，媒体才会逐渐从推动舆情转变为抑制舆情，但在此过程中，舆情已扩散，控制效果有限。突发事件敏感性越高，传播越快，通过监管媒体控制舆情的效果越差。监管部门发布信息对控制舆情更有效，然而当公信力较低时，发布信息的效果也有限，还需同时监管媒体。本文不仅探讨了监管部门媒体博弈的稳定解，还考虑了达到稳定解过程中舆情的传播，以及舆情扩散对博弈双方收益的影响，从而影响双方博弈策略，为控制舆情提供了理论支持和实践指导。

Abstract: [Purpose] Online public sentiment stemming from emergencies can induce social panic, and supervision departments can mitigate the propagation of public sentiment by regulating online media or disseminating official information. [Method] This study integrates the evolutionary game model of supervision department-media interaction with the model of public sentiment dissemination to explore effective strategies for managing public sentiment. [Conclusion] The findings reveal that online media will transition from promoting to suppressing public sentiment only under high-intensity supervision department sanctions, yet this shift occurs when public sentiment spreads, limiting its effectiveness. Emergencies with higher sensitivity will spread faster, diminishing the efficacy of media regulation to control public sentiment. The dissemination of official supervision department information proves more effective in controlling public sentiment. However, when credibility is low, the effectiveness of information dissemination is limited, necessitating concurrent media regulation. This paper not only delves into stable solutions in the supervision department-media game but also considers the spread of public opinion during the convergence to stable solutions and its influence on the gains of both players, thereby shaping their strategies and offering theoretical underpinning and practical insights into public sentiment control.