绿色建筑供应链的关键主体演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Key Subjects in Green Building Supply Chain

摘要: 基于演化博弈理论，本文构建了开发商–施工单位–政府–消费者的四方动态博弈模型，研究各方在绿色建筑供应链中不同情形下的稳定策略，并运用MATLAB进行数值仿真，分析开发商、施工单位、政府和消费者的决策演化路径与变化趋势，探究奖惩参数变化对博弈各主体行为决策的影响，为促进各方利益协调和绿色建筑供应链整体发展提供决策依据。研究表明：政府对市场的奖惩均有利于开发商和施工单位对绿色建筑的建设，提高消费者的购房意愿，但过高的补贴会增大政府的财政负担；调整对消费者的购房补贴最有效，施工单位对绿色施工的补贴最敏感；与施工单位相比，提高对开发商的处罚效果更好。

Abstract: Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a four-way dynamic game model of developer-construction-government-consumer, studies the stability strategies of all parties in the green building supply chain under different situations, and uses MATLAB for numerical simulation to analyze the decision-making evolution path and changing trend of developers, constructors, governments and consumers, to explore the influence of the change of reward and punishment parameters on the behavioral decision of each player in the game and provide decision-making basis for promoting the coordination of interests of all parties and the overall development of green building supply chain. The research shows The results show that the government’s rewards and punishments are conducive to the construction of green buildings by developers and construction units, and increasing the willingness of consumers to buy houses, but excessive subsidies will increase the financial burden of the government; the adjustment of the purchase subsidy for consumers is the most effective, and the construction unit is the most sensitive to the subsidy for green construction. Compared with the construction unit, it is better to improve the punishment effect on the developer.