演化博弈视角下消费者与电商平台商家之间的消费选择
Consumption Choice between Consumers and E-Commerce Platform Merchants from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game
摘要: 电商平台的快速发展不断促进经济的增长,也使得人们的生活变得更加便捷,享受到更多优质化的服务。然而,线上市场提供便利服务的同时,电商平台中的商家信息不同,产品质量、定价以及品牌不同等因素影响着消费者的选择,商家在通过自身特性选择消费者的同时也诱导着消费者对商家的选择。商家与消费者之间的信息处于动态变化之中,故商家与消费者通过动态博弈相互选择。本文通过演化博弈理论,在演化博弈的视角下分析消费者与电商平台商家之间的消费选择,以期达到动态平衡,减少双方博弈成本,实现双方效应最大化。合理博弈促进市场竞争,双方利益增加,为避免不合理、非法博弈,提出以下建议:(1) 加强市场监管力度与执法力度;(2) 提升平台服务质量,加强消费者权益保护。
Abstract: The rapid development of e-commerce platforms continues to promote economic growth and make people's lives more convenient and enjoy more quality services. However, while the online market provides convenient services, e-commerce platforms have different information about merchants, product quality, pricing and branding, and other factors that affect consumer choice, and merchants select consumers through their own characteristics while inducing consumers to choose merchants. The information between merchants and consumers is in dynamic change, so merchants and consumers choose each other through dynamic games. This paper analyses the consumer choice between consumers and e-commerce platform merchants from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, with a view to achieving dynamic equilibrium, reducing the cost of the game for both sides, and maximizing the effect of both sides. Reasonable game to promote market competition, the interests of both sides increased, in order to avoid unreasonable, illegal game, put forward the following suggestions: (1) strengthen market supervision and law enforcement; (2) enhance the quality of platform services, and strengthen the protection of consumer rights and interests.
文章引用:侯硕. 演化博弈视角下消费者与电商平台商家之间的消费选择[J]. 电子商务评论, 2024, 13(4): 1681-1686. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2024.1341321

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