FIN  >> Vol. 6 No. 2 (April 2016)

    上市国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性结构化解析
    Research on Executive Pay Performance Sensitivity Structure of Chinese State-Owned Listed Companies

  • 全文下载: PDF(518KB) HTML   XML   PP.74-88   DOI: 10.12677/FIN.2016.62008  
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作者:  

孙 丽,杨丽萍:华东师范大学经济与管理学部经济金融系,上海

关键词:
高管薪酬企业绩效薪酬业绩敏感性国有企业国企改革Executive Compensation Corporate Performance Pay Performance Sensitivity State-Owned Enterprises SOE Reform

摘要:

本文以2006~2013年1001家国有上市公司为样本,通过动态面板数据构建多元回归模型对国有企业薪酬业绩敏感性结构化差异进行实证检验,比较了中央控股国有企业和地方控股国有企业在薪酬业绩上的不同表现,及国企高管业绩敏感性在行业上的差异。研究发现:(1) 我国国有上市公司高管薪酬与业绩存在相关性,但其薪酬业绩敏感性显著低于非国有上市公司;(2) 国有上市公司中,央企高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著低于地方国企;(3) 金融行业国有上市公司管理层的薪酬业绩敏感性显著低于其他行业。实证结果有助于明确未来国企薪酬改革政策的指向性,本文据此提出了多层次治理建议,对国企薪酬制度的进一步完善具有参考意义。

In this paper, the sample of the models includes 2561 China’s state-owned listed companies from 2006 to 2013 (including the 1001 state-owned listed companies). By constructing the panel data regression models, this research compares the difference between the executive pay performance sensitivity of central state-owned enterprise and that of local state-owned enterprises, as well as the difference of executive pay performance sensitivity of state-owned financial institutions and state-owned non-financial institutions. The study result shows that: (1) there is a significant cor-relation between the executive pay and company performance of China’s state-owned listed com-panies, but the executive PPS of state-owned listed companies is evidently lower than that of non- state-owned listed companies. (2) Executive PPS of central state-owned companies was significantly lower than that of local state-owned companies. (3) Executive pay performance sensitivity of state-owned financial enterprises was significantly lower than that of state-owned non-financial enterprises. When it comes to policy on executive compensation regulation of state-owned enter-prises, items should also be more targeted. This study offers reference for further optimization for executive performance appraisal system in state-owned companies.

文章引用:
孙丽, 杨丽萍. 上市国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性结构化解析[J]. 金融, 2016, 6(2): 74-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/FIN.2016.62008

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